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Three Men Face Charges Over Alleged $129 Million Deepfake CEO Fraud

Stock photo: laptop desk payment forms
Photo: Pavel Danilyuk / Pexels

A federal indictment unsealed in New York accuses three men of using AI-generated voices and, in some calls, video of company chief executives and lawyers to persuade accounting staff to wire money. According to the Justice Department, the scheme ran from July 2024 to February 2026 and cost companies more than $129 million. The men are named in the indictment and are presumed innocent unless proven guilty. For a business that automates payments or approvals, the practical lesson is that a voice or face on a call is no longer proof of identity. Payment changes and urgent wire requests need a check that runs outside the channel the request came through, and a named person who signs off on it.

In short

  • A US indictment accuses three men of using AI voices and video to pose as executives and lawyers, with losses alleged at $129 million.
  • The alleged scheme targeted accounting staff who could approve large wire transfers.
  • A voice or face on a call is not proof of identity; verify through a channel the request did not use.
  • Automation can queue, flag and hold risky payments, but people still decide and make the callback.
  • The men are presumed innocent, and the allegations have not been tested in court.

What happened

According to the indictment, which was unsealed on 5 November 2026 in the Southern District of New York, Jacob Soall, Sharon Hazan and Guy Sheetrit face seven counts each, including conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft and money laundering. Prosecutors say the group targeted accounting employees who had authority to approve large wire transfers. The approach usually began with an email sent through an electronic signature service such as DocuSign, which appeared to come from the company's chief executive. The message described a confidential deal, asked the employee to sign a non-disclosure agreement, and pointed them to a supposed attorney at a large international law firm. On a later phone or video call, the group used AI to imitate the executive's voice and, in some cases, image, according to the indictment as reported by CyberScoop and the Associated Press.

The scale is the main reason the case is getting attention. Prosecutors put the total at about $129 million. The largest single loss named in the indictment, $11.6 million, was suffered by a UK financial technology company, according to Help Net Security. BankInfoSecurity reports that the six losses the indictment identifies in detail total about $32 million, which means most of the $129 million sits in losses that are not itemised in public reporting. The period is also described differently across outlets. The New York Times, as reported in the brief, describes roughly 18 months from July 2024. Other reports give the end date as February 2026.

Reporting also disagrees on the reach of the case. Some outlets describe thousands of targeted businesses, while the indictment's named victims are a smaller group. Some outlets describe deepfake video, while The Record describes calls. The Justice Department release does not say how the voices and images were generated, how any victim's bank flagged the transfers, or how much money has been recovered.

Where the men are now

BankInfoSecurity reports that the three men were arrested in Spain and Britain and face extradition to the United States. The allegations have not been tested in court, and nothing in the reporting so far shows a plea or verdict.

Why it matters for businesses that automate work

The scheme did not break into a computer system. It used trust in a voice, a signature request and a formal-sounding legal step. That matters for any business that has automated its payment approvals, because automation often makes a payment faster to release. If the workflow treats an approval message or a call as enough, a faster process can move a fraudulent payment faster too.

Federal guidance already points in this direction. A 2023 information sheet from the National Security Agency, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency advised organisations to verify identities in real time when executing financial transactions, for example with a one-time password. It also advised rehearsing responses with the staff most likely to be targeted, as reported by American Banker.

What changes in practice, at any size

A five-person firm and a group with thousands of staff face the same basic control. Before a new payee, a changed bank account or an urgent large transfer is paid, someone should confirm it through a channel that the request did not use. In practice that means calling a phone number already on file, not one given in the message, and recording who made the call and when.

Automation can help with the parts that are repetitive. A workflow can flag any wire over a set amount, any change to vendor bank details, and any request that arrives with words like confidential or urgent. It can place those items in a queue, attach the vendor record and the original message, and block release until a second named person approves. Staff should still make the judgement calls. Automation cannot tell whether a voice is real, and it cannot decide whether a deal is genuine. Those decisions stay with people who know the business and can call the executive directly.

Limits matter here. A rule that every payment needs two approvals will slow down ordinary business. Firms should set thresholds based on their own payment patterns, and review them after any false alarm or missed case. The right thresholds depend on the firm's own figures, which a review of its payment records will show.

What to watch next

Three developments will show how far the case reaches. The first is extradition, since the US has asked for all three men to be sent to the United States. The second is the charging stage, where the defendants will enter pleas and the court will set a schedule. The third is whether more victims come forward. The FBI has asked anyone who believes they were a victim to use its tips page, according to the Justice Department release as reported by ZeroHedge. Finance teams should also watch for updated federal guidance on AI impersonation, since the 2023 sheet predates the scale reported in this case.

How AiStaffo would automate this

An AiStaffo AI worker would sit between incoming payment requests and the bank approval step. It would read each wire or payment-change request, compare the payee name, account and amount against the vendor record, and flag anything new, changed or marked urgent. It would place the item in a hold queue with the original message attached and create a callback task for a named person, who phones the executive on a number already on file. The worker would log who confirmed what and when. The owner or finance lead still decides whether the payment goes out and still speaks to the executive. Book a free automation audit.

Questions people ask

Is the $129 million loss confirmed?
The $129 million figure comes from the federal indictment, which prosecutors say reflects losses across the scheme. It is an allegation, and the three men are presumed innocent unless proven guilty. BankInfoSecurity reports that the six losses the indictment itemises total about $32 million.
Who is accused in the deepfake CEO case?
According to the indictment, Jacob Soall, Sharon Hazan and Guy Sheetrit face seven counts each, including wire fraud and money laundering. The indictment was unsealed on 5 November 2026 in New York. Reporting says the three were arrested in Spain and Britain and face extradition.
Can a business rely on recognising a CEO's voice on a call?
No. The case alleges that AI was used to imitate voices and, in some calls, images. Federal guidance from 2023 advised organisations to verify identities in real time during financial transactions, for example with a one-time password. A callback to a number already on file is a common practical step.
Does automation stop this kind of fraud?
Automation can hold, flag and route payment requests, which slows a fraudulent payment long enough for a human check. It cannot judge whether a voice or a deal is genuine. People still need to make the call, and the thresholds should match the firm's own payment patterns.
What should a finance team change first?
Start with the rules for new payees, changed bank details and urgent large transfers. Require confirmation through a channel the request did not use, and require a second named approver. Rehearse the process with the staff who approve payments.

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